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We examine time-varying behaviour and determinants of asset swap (ASW) spreads for 23 iBoxx European
corporate bond indexes from January 2006 to January 2009. The results of a Markov switching model
suggest that ASW spreads exhibit regime-dependent behaviour. The evidence is particularly strong for
Financial and Corporates Subordinated indexes. Stock market volatility determines ASW spread changes
in turbulent periods, whereas stock returns tend to affect spread changes in calm periods. While market
liquidity affects spreads only in turbulent regimes the level of interest rates is an important determinant of
spread changes in both regimes. Finally, we identify stock returns, lagged ASW spread levels, and lagged
volatility of ASW spreads as major drivers of the regime shifts. The results are robust in the extended
sample (January 2006 to October 2013) that includes a post-crisis period.
Keywords: European bonds; asset swaps; credit risk; financial crisis; Markov switching
JEL Classification: C13; C32; G12
1. Introduction
An asset swap (ASW) is a synthetic position that combines a fixed rate bond with a fixed-to-floating
interest rate swap.1 The bondholder effectively transforms the pay-off, where she pays the fixed
rate and receives the floating rate consisting of LIBOR (or EURIBOR) plus the ASW spread. In
case of a default, the owner of the bond receives the recovery value and still has to honour the
interest rate swap. The ASW spread is a compensation for the default risk and corresponds to the
difference between the floating part of an ASW and the LIBOR (or EURIBOR) rate. Corporate
bonds are always quoted with their ASW spreads and their pricing is based on the spreads.
ASWs are very liquid and could be traded separately, even easier than underlying defaultable
bonds (Schönbucher 2003). ASW spreads are, therefore, a bond-specific measure of credit risk
implied in bond prices and yields. Asset-swapped fixed-rate bonds financed in the repo market are
comparable to credit default swap (CDS) contracts (Francis, Kakodkar, and Martin 2003). ASW
therefore usually trades in a close range (see Zhu 2004; Norden and Weber 2009) and tends to be
cointegrated with CDS (De Wit 2006).
Previous studies examine determinants of credit spreads inferred from CDS indexes (Byström
2006; Alexander and Kaeck 2008; Naifar 2010; Benbouzid and Mallick 2013), single name CDS
spreads (Cossin et al. 2002; Benkert 2004; Hull, Predescu, and White 2004; Yu 2005; Fabozzi,
Cheng, and Chen 2007; Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo-Helfenberger 2009; Tang and Yan 2010),
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individual corporate bonds (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001; Tsuji 2005), and
bond portfolios/indexes (Pedrosa and Roll 1998). There was, however, no previous study on
determinants of credit spreads inferred from ASW indexes. Our objective is twofold. First, we
examine determinants of ASW spreads for the first time in the literature. Second, we examine
the time-varying nature of the association of ASW spreads and their economic determinants. The
examination of ASW spreads across different industries and in different regimes is important for
the following reasons. First, previous work in asset pricing incorporating regime switching has
considered either a single or a small set of risky assets while cross-sectional effects of regimes on
asset returns (especially in large samples) have been far less studied (Ang and Timmermann 2011,
19). Consideration of credit spreads in different market regimes is also important for practition-
ers involved in trading strategies involving mispricing between credit, bond, and equity markets.
For example, some of the empirical hedge ratios used in the above strategies may become less
effective when market exhibits regime-switching behaviour (see Yu 2005; Alexander and Kaeck
2008). The hedge ratios may also be affected by different factors (e.g. industry-related or global)
in different market regimes (Aretz and Pope 2013).
Second, previous studies rarely examine industry portfolios although individual assets and
industry portfolios may differ in terms of their sensitivity and exposure to regime changes (Ang
and Timmermann 2011, 19). Studying credit spread indexes (rather than credit spreads for indi-
vidual bonds) is particularly useful in order to shed light on the systematic components of credit
valuation that resist elimination by diversification (Pedrosa and Roll 1998). The availability of
numerousASW indexes allows us to examine the systematic components of credit risk in portfolios
constructed for different industries, credit ratings, seniority, and regulatory considerations.
Finally, the bond market is characterized by a relatively high trade frequency and small average
trade size compared to the CDS market (IOSCO 2012). A combination of netting, centralized
clearing, and reduced spreads contributed to a 48% fall in notional amounts outstanding of CDS
worldwide, from $58 trillion at the end of 2007 to $30.3 trillion at the end of June 2010 (IFSL 2012,
5). At the same time, the issuance of investment grade bonds in European markets has increased
almost threefold, reaching the ¤140 billion mark at the beginning of 2009 (IFSL 2009). Due to the
limited trading in CDS names, CDS indexes are not available for all industries (e.g. health care,
automobiles and parts, utilities, etc.). On the other hand, given that ASWs are synthetic positions
that combine fixed-bond coupon payments and fixed-for-floating rate swap transactions, we can
calculate ASW indexes for any industry (even for industries where no ASW trading takes place)
with a liquid market for (individual) bonds. Furthermore, Mayordomo, Pena, and Romo (2011)
raise doubts about the representativeness of prices quoted in the CDS market during periods of
financial crisis and diminishing liquidity. When liquidity drops sharply, CDS movements are more
likely to be unrelated to default expectations. Consistent with the above, Mayordomo, Pena, and
Romo (2011) show that during the recent crisis ASW spreads led CDS spreads and, thus, proved
to be a more efficient indicator of credit risk.
Most related to our work is the study ofAlexander and Kaeck (2008), who examine determinants
of iTraxx Europe CDS indexes. Their analysis however was limited to a pre-crisis period (June
2004–June 2007). In addition, due to the lack of availability of CDS indexes for different sectors,
their focus was on available iTraxx Europe CDS indexes: main, non-financials, high volatility,
financials senior, and financials subordinated. We, therefore, contribute to the literature by examin-
ing determinants of ASW spreads for 10 industries (automobiles, chemicals, food and beverages,
health care, oil and gas, personal and household goods, retail, telecommunications, utility, and
banks) and 13 composite iBoxx indexes stratified by industry grouping (Corporates, Financials,
Non-Financials), credit rating (from AAA to BBB), and seniority (Senior and Subordinated), in
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different market regimes. We also extend the Alexander and Kaeck (2008) model for determinants
of credit spreads by considering market liquidity.
Our main findings are: (i) ASW spreads behave differently during periods of financial turmoil,
with a residual volatility which is up to eight times higher compared to calm periods; (ii) structural
determinants explain ASW spreads better for financial sector companies than for the remaining
industry sectors; (iii) we find little evidence of regime switching in non-cyclical industry sectors
(e.g. utility, chemicals, telecoms); (iv) the financial sector shows a high degree of autocorrelation in
ASW spreads, which is mostly negative in calm but highly positive in turbulent market periods; (v)
stock market volatility determinesASW spreads mainly in turbulent periods, whereas stock returns
are more important in periods of lower volatility; (vi) interest rates are an important determinant in
both market regimes; (vii) the liquidity premium, defined as the difference between the swap and
the government bond yield curve tends to be relevant only in turbulent regimes; (viii) raising stock
market returns and interest rates tend to reduce the probability of entering the volatile regime;
(ix) our Markov switching model exhibits better accuracy than the equivalent OLS model for
determinants of ASW spreads.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 motivates our hypotheses.
Section 3 describes data and methodology. In Section 4, we present results of our Markov switching
model. In Section 5, we discuss the economic identification of the regimes and examine the main
drivers of the regime switching. This is followed by various robustness checks performed in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 sums up and concludes.
2. Literature and hypotheses
The pricing of credit risk has evolved in two main approaches. First, reduced form models treat
default as an unpredictable event, where the time of default is specified as a stochastic jump
process.2 Second, structural models build on Merton (1974) and Black and Scholes (1973) con-
tributions.3 Since structural models offer an economically intuitive framework to the pricing of
credit risk, a large body of empirical literature has grown testing theoretical determinants of credit
spreads with market data.4 For example, within the structural framework, default is triggered when
the leverage ratio approaches unity (i.e. debt equals total assets, thus, no equity is left).An increase
in firm value is, thus, reducing the leverage and is, therefore, reducing the probability of default
(and credit spreads). Similarly, according to option pricing theory, owning a corporate bond is
analogous to owning the firm’s assets and giving a call option (with an exercise price equal to
the amount of debt) on the assets to equity holders. It is clear that an increase in asset (i.e. firm)
value is associated with lower probability of default and higher corporate bond values. On the
other hand, an increase in the firms’ volatility increases the value for equity holders (i.e. value of
the call option) at the expense of bondholders (i.e. increasing probability of default and lowering
corporate bond values). We, therefore, test the following hypotheses:
H1: ASW spreads are negatively related to firms’ value.
H2: ASW spreads are positively related to firms’ volatility.
Firms’ value and volatility, however, cannot be measured directly. For this reason, previous
related studies use stock market returns and various volatility indexes to proxy for the firms’value
and volatility (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 2001; Huang and Kong 2003; Alexander
and Kaeck 2008; Aretz and Pope 2013). When (past) realized stock market returns are higher (i.e.
business climate is better), implied equity values (and, thus, also the firm value) are also higher.
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Higher firm values imply lower probability of default and higher recovery rates (Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Martin 2001). The use of returns on stock market and volatility indexes in our
study is further justified by the fact that we examine ASW spreads for corporate bond indexes
rather than for individual bonds.
In addition to firm values and volatility, the risk-free rate plays an important role in structural
models. The contingent claim (i.e. option pricing) framework for valuation of corporate securities
is essentially a risk-neutral valuation. Since higher risk-free rates increase the risk-neutral drift,
they lower the probability of default (Merton 1974). The lower probability of default narrows the
credit spread and leads to a negative association of interest rates and credit spreads (Longstaff
and Schwartz 1995). The risk-free interest rate is, therefore, expected to be negatively related
to default risk. Another argument supporting the inverse relationship between interest rates and
credit spreads refers to the consideration of business cycles. For example, in periods of economic
recessions when both interest rates and stock market returns tend to be lower, corporate defaults
with low recovery rates tend to occur more often.
Early empirical papers use government bond yields as a proxy for the risk-free rate. Although
swap interest rates are not completely free of risk they are often regarded as a better benchmark
for the risk-free rate than government yields (Houweling and Vorst 2005). For example, they do
not suffer from temporary pikes sometimes caused by characteristics of repo agreements involv-
ing government bonds. Furthermore, swaps have no short sale constraints, are less influenced
by regulatory or taxation issues, and tend not to be affected by scarcity premiums in times of
shrinking budget austerity. Finally, swap rates closely correspond to the funding costs of market
participants (see Hull, Predescu, and White 2004; Houweling and Vorst 2005). Overall, we expect
a negative association between ASW spreads and swap interest rates. Thus, we test the following
hypothesis:
H3: ASW spreads are negatively related to swap interest rate level changes.
A further possible determinant of credit spreads is the difference between the swap interest
rate and the interest rate on a par value government bond of the same maturity, known as the
swap spread (Duffie and Singleton 1999; Liu, Longstaff, and Mandell 2006). Feldhütter and
Lando (2008) decomposed the swap spread into a credit risk element, a convenience premium,
and idiosyncratic risk factors. They concluded that the major determinant of swap spreads was
the convenience yield defined as investors’ willingness to pay a premium for the liquidity of
government bonds. The importance of the convenience yield is especially apparent in unsettled
markets. For example, dramatic events during the recent crisis altered investors’ risk perception
and consequently increased demand for more liquid assets, such as government bonds (so-called
flight to liquidity).5 The higher demand inevitably resulted in higher prices and, thus, lower yields
relative to other asset classes (see Aussenegg, Götz, and Jelic 2013).6
Empirical evidence for the association of swap spreads and credit spreads is provided for
several markets. For example, Brown, In, and Fang (2002) report a significant positive relationship
between swap and credit spreads in the Australian market. Kobor, Shi, and Zelenko (2005) find
a positive long-term relationship between swap spreads and credit spreads for US AA-rated
bonds with maturities of 2, 5, and 10 years. Finally, Schlecker (2009) documents a cointegration
relationship of credit spreads with swap spreads for the US as well as the European corporate
bond markets. We, therefore, test the following hypothesis:
H4: ASW spreads are positively related to swap spreads.
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3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data
Our sample consists of ASW spreads for 23 different iBoxx European corporate bond indexes,
provided by Markit. The sample encompasses 10 industry indexes (automobiles, chemicals, food
and beverages, health care, oil and gas, personal and household goods, retail, telecommunications,
utility, and banks) and 13 composite indexes stratified by industry groupings (Corporates, Finan-
cials, Non-financials), regulatory considerations (Tier 1 Capital, Lower Tier 2 Capital), credit
rating (from AAA to BBB), and seniority (Senior and Subordinated). In our analysis we focus on
the period from 1 January 2006 until 30 January 2009, including 779 trading days.
Sample bond indexes are grouped based on the classification and strict criteria provided by
Markit. For example, the market capitalization weighted iBoxx Benchmark indexes consist of
liquid bonds with a minimum amount outstanding of at least ¤500 million and a minimum time
to maturity of 1 year. Furthermore, the bonds need to have an investment grade rating and a fixed
coupon rate. Bonds with embedded options, such as sinking funds and amortizing bonds, callable
and undated bonds, floating rate notes, convertible bonds, bonds with conversion options, and
collateralized debt obligations, are all excluded from the iBoxx bond indexes.
Bond index values are calculated daily based on market prices, thus, they represent the most
accurate and timely bond pricing available. More specifically, the ASW spread (ASWi,t) for each
of the bonds included in the index is calculated based on the present value of fixed pay-offs
(PVFixed) and floating pay-offs (PVFloating) of a synthetic ASW and the bond’s dirty price (DP):7
ASWi,t = (PVFixed − DP)PVFloating . (1)
The starting point in calculating the ASW spread is, therefore, distinguishing between the present
value of fixed (PVFixed) and the present value of floating payments (PVFloating):8
PVFixed =
T∑
t=1
Ct · DFFixedt + PrincipalT · DFFixedt , (2)
PVFloating =
T∑
t=1
(
Lt
360
)
· DFFloatingt . (3)
Ct is the current coupon; Lt is the number of days between floating rate payments; Discount factors
for fixed (DFFixed) and floating rate (DFFloating) payments are determined based on the Markit Swap
curve.9 The ASW spread for each of the 23 sample indexes (ASWt) is then calculated as market
value-weighted average of the n index constituents:
ASWt =
n∑
i=1
ASWi,t · WMVi,t , (4)
where WMVi,t is the (market value) weight of bond i on trading day t.
3.2 Sample descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics of our sample of ASW spreads are provided in Table 1. Financials and Non-
financials are composite indexes that include bonds from respective sectors. Corporate composite
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for iBoxx corporate bond index ASW spreads.
Average Ann Time Mean Median Ann. Stock index (DJ Euro
No. of Notional volume mod. to daily daily Std. std. Excess Mean Median Stoxx sector index, if
Sector bonds billion ¤ million ¤ duration mat. change change dev. dev. Skewness kurtosis spread spread not otherwise specified)
Automobiles and parts 50 48.1 962.5 2.72 3.54 0.41 0.00 4.27 67.74 2.29∗∗ 22.71∗∗ 70.02 32.42 Automobiles and parts
Chemicals 31 24.7 795.2 3.96 4.94 0.23 0.01 3.06 48.60 1.53∗∗ 12.75∗∗ 67.35 51.05 Chemicals
Food and beverages 17 14.3 838.2 3.81 4.65 0.23 0.05 3.72 59.03 1.69∗∗ 19.93∗∗ 67.17 39.58 Food and beverages
Health care 17 15.3 900.0 4.56 5.83 0.17 −0.01 2.79 44.29 1.44∗∗ 12.54∗∗ 39.93 15.27 Health care
Oil and gas 32 27.9 872.0 3.75 5.13 0.32 0.06 3.61 57.28 0.22∗ 21.06∗∗ 94.08 53.67 Oil and gas
Personal and household goods 28 24.8 886.1 4.15 5.36 0.25 0.03 2.98 47.32 1.81∗∗ 14.47∗∗ 74.55 48.03 Personal and
household goods
Retail 27 21.0 777.8 3.56 4.99 0.31 0.04 3.27 51.98 1.91∗∗ 11.64∗∗ 70.46 36.50 Retail
Telecommunications 93 92.2 991.8 3.97 5.68 0.26 −0.01 3.02 47.88 1.94∗∗ 14.66∗∗ 83.88 55.81 Telecommunications
Utility 117 95.0 811.9 5.11 6.87 0.20 0.01 2.68 42.60 1.47∗∗ 17.76∗∗ 48.30 29.53 Utility
Corporates AAA 36 49.0 1360.4 4.22 5.67 0.22 0.01 3.67 58.27 3.53∗∗ 43.59∗∗ 28.81 4.79 DJ Euro Stoxx 600
Corporates AA 251 273.0 1087.5 3.74 4.91 0.29 0.06 2.91 46.27 1.57∗∗ 21.43∗∗ 55.74 12.55 DJ Euro Stoxx 600
Corporates A 552 471.3 853.9 3.94 5.41 0.46 0.09 2.88 45.78 1.72∗∗ 12.37∗∗ 98.71 40.53 DJ Euro Stoxx 600
Corporates BBB 243 191.7 789.1 3.73 5.38 0.50 0.06 3.21 50.97 2.57∗∗ 16.48∗∗ 119.55 65.54 DJ Euro Stoxx 600
Corporates senior 811 760.9 938.3 3.87 5.16 0.30 0.03 2.70 42.86 2.08∗∗ 14.81∗∗ 68.49 32.05 DJ Euro Stoxx 600
Corporates subordinated 271 224.1 826.9 3.78 5.68 0.86 0.21 3.28 52.10 2.23∗∗ 10.35∗∗ 153.60 62.49 DJ Euro Stoxx 600
Corporates composite 1082 985.0 910.4 3.85 5.28 0.40 0.09 2.73 43.27 2.13∗∗ 13.99∗∗ 87.79 39.52 DJ Euro Stoxx 600
Non-financials 527 449.7 853.4 4.12 5.57 0.29 0.02 2.79 44.25 1.70∗∗ 13.25∗∗ 74.64 42.93 FTSE World Europe
ex Fin.
Financials 555 535.3 964.5 3.60 5.04 0.50 0.14 2.94 46.70 2.50∗∗ 16.40∗∗ 98.90 36.23 Financials
Financials senior 284 318.5 1121.6 3.54 4.63 0.32 0.09 2.99 47.41 2.41∗∗ 20.41∗∗ 61.28 16.08 Financials
Financials subordinated 271 216.8 799.9 3.73 5.64 0.87 0.22 3.28 52.04 2.25∗∗ 10.63∗∗ 151.13 57.98 Financials
Banks 429 423.9 988.0 3.58 4.94 0.47 0.13 3.11 49.41 3.93∗∗ 37.98∗∗ 92.10 34.15 Banks
Tier 1 capital 83 62.2 749.4 3.47 6.31 1.77 0.36 6.36 100.90 3.87∗∗ 24.41∗∗ 243.54 98.66 Financials
Lower Tier 2 capital 125 102.8 822.6 3.77 5.05 0.56 0.17 2.94 46.73 2.49∗∗ 16.07∗∗ 95.83 25.80 Financials
Notes: Statistics for the respective iBoxx Corporate Bond Index ASW Spreads from 1 January 2006 until 30 January 2009 (779 daily observations for each sector). The number of
constituents in the respective iBoxx index is given in the first column. Annualized Modified Duration and Time to Maturity (Mat.) are given in years. The mean and median daily
change of ASW spreads is given in basis points. The standard deviation of daily changes is given in basis points and the annualized Standard Deviation is given in annualized basis
points. The mean and median of ASW spreads are denoted in basis points. Finally, the respective stock index for every ASW sector is reported in the last column. These are the
corresponding DJ Euro Stoxx sector indexes (except for the group of non-financial firms where the FTSE World Europe ex Financials index is used) and the DJ Euro Stoxx 600
index (Stoxx 600).
∗Significance at the 5% level.
∗∗Significance at the 1% level.
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is a composite index and includes 1082 corporate bonds that constitute all sample indexes. The
average size of our bonds included in the Corporate composite index amounts to ¤910.4 million.
AAA-rated bonds have the highest volume with an average issue size of more than ¤1.3 billion.
The notional amount of all bonds in our sample totals ¤985 billion by the end of January 2009.
The mean ASW spread for the Corporate composite Index is 87.8 basis points. The average
time to maturity of all bonds included in this index amounts to 5.28 years.10 The median daily
change in ASW spreads is the highest for Tier 1 Capital ASW spreads and lowest for health
care and telecommunication sectors. The values for the annualized standard deviation highlight
significant time-series variations. For the Tier 1 Capital sub-sample, for example, the annualized
standard deviation is 2.4 times higher than that for the utility sector. Daily spread changes are
highly leptokurtic for all sectors. The skewness of spreads is generally positive, with extreme
values for Banks, Tier 1 Capital, and AAA-rated corporate bonds.11 These three sectors exhibit
the highest level of (positive) skewness and excess-kurtosis.
Differences in median ASW daily spread changes, across credit ratings, are not significant. For
example, AA and BBB have the same median daily spread changes (see Table 1). The absence of
significant differences in median ASW spread changes across different ratings during the crisis
period is in line with the results for the lack of differences in excess returns on iBoxx bond
indexes reported in Aussenegg, Götz, and Jelic (2013).12 The differences between average (mean
and median) ASW spread changes for senior and subordinated bonds are notable (see Table 1).
Figure 1 presents the co-movement of ASW spreads for 10 different industry sectors. As
expected, the ASW spreads for the financial sector dominate the spreads of all other industries.
Other sectors with above-average spreads during the credit crisis (especially in the year 2008) are
oil and gas as well as automobiles and parts. Overall, we observe a significant increase in levels,
volatility, and diversity of ASW spreads during the credit crisis. This was accompanied with a
sharp drop in European stock markets (since Summer of 2007) and interest rates (since Summer
of 2008).
Figure 1. Sample ASW spreads stratified by industry sectors.
Notes: This table presents the development of ASW spreads (in basis points) for 10 selected industry sectors
included in our sample, from 1 January 2006 until 30 January 2009.
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3.3 Markov switching model
The reported leptokurtic distribution of our sample ASW spreads together with time-varying
properties of the parameters call for consideration of nonlinearity and regime shifts. Markov
models provide an intuitive way to model structural breaks and regime shifts in the data generating
process.13 The models define different regimes allowing for dynamic shifts of economic variables
at any given point in time conditional on an unobservable state variable, st . Another advantage
of using a latent variable st is the constantly updated estimate of the conditional state probability
of being in a particular state at a certain point in time. In our specification the state parameter st
is assumed to follow a first-order, two-state Markov chain where the transition probabilities are
assumed to be constant.
We estimate a two-state Markov model explaining ASW spread changes (ASWk,t), for each
sector k:14
ASWk,t = βS,k,0 + βS,k,1ASWk,t−1 + βS,k,2Stock returnk,t + βS,k,3VStoxxt
+ βS,k,4IR_Levelt + βS,k,5Swap Spreadt + εS,k,t . (5)
The dependent variable, ASWk,t , is the change (rather than level) in the ASW spread of industry
sector k on day t.15 βS,k,j is a matrix of j regression coefficients as used in model of the kth sector,
which is dependent on the state parameter s. ASWk,t−1 is the one period lagged ASW spread
change. The inclusion of lagged spread changes (ASWk,t−1) as control variable is motivated by
both previous studies and properties of our sample.16
Equity values (Stock returnk,t) are proxied by respective Dow Jones (DJ) Euro Stoxx indexes
which are also provided by Markit (see Table 1).17 The VStoxx index (VStoxxt) is used as a
proxy for the implied volatility, since it is the reference measure for the volatility in European
markets.18
The change in the level of interest rates is estimated by principal component analysis (PCA)
using Euro swap rates with maturities between 1 and 10 years (i.e. 10 maturity brackets). The PCA
allows us to use the entire term structure of interest rates and, thus, avoids an arbitrary selection
of a point from the yield curve.19 Since the input to the PCA must be stationary, we use the first
difference of interest rate swap rates.20 As a result, the PC themselves are stationary and can be
directly used in our regressions without using first differences.
In the PCA context, swap rate maturities represent key liquidity points. The PCA uses historical
shifts in the swap rates to compute the correlation matrix of the shifts. The matrix is then used to
compute eigenvectors and eigenvalues. The first eigenvector corresponds to a level and the second
to a slope of the swap rate curve shift. The computed eigenvalues are in fact weights, which tell us
the relative importance of the level and slope shifts. The resulting first principal component of our
analysis (IR_Levelt), therefore, reveals the changes in the level of the entire swap rate curve.
Specifically, in our study, the first PC (the variable IR_Levelt used in Equation (5)) explains
92.7% of interest rate level changes.
The swap spread, as a proxy for bond market liquidity, is measured as the difference between
the 5-year European swap interest rate and the yield of German government bonds of the same
maturity.21 Swap Spreadt in Equation (5) represents daily changes in the Swap spread. εS,k,t is a
vector of disturbance terms, assumed to be normal with state-dependent variance σ 2S,k,t . Descrip-
tive statistics for all explanatory variables, together with expected signs of the coefficients in
Equation (5), are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for determinants of ASW spreads.
Independent Excess Expected relation
variables Mean Median Std. dev. Skewness kurtosis with ASW changes
Stock index returns:
DJ Euro Stoxx 600 −0.00063 0.00044 0.01553 −0.12331 7.73886 −
Automobiles and
parts
−0.00071 0.00015 0.02094 0.08734 9.12611 −
Chemicals −0.00020 0.00072 0.01705 −0.14978 9.82896 −
Food and beverages −0.00018 0.00088 0.01345 −0.55294 5.14338 −
Health care −0.00049 −0.00029 0.01456 0.04252 7.24707 −
Oil and gas −0.00049 0.00029 0.01962 0.34371 10.24587 −
Personal and
household goods
−0.00052 0.00031 0.01570 0.24900 5.89605 −
Retail −0.00030 0.00013 0.01516 −0.16217 5.19435 −
Telecommunications −0.00020 0.00019 0.01437 0.28380 10.37985 −
Utility −0.00006 0.00053 0.01728 0.58444 15.59000 −
Financial −0.00114 −0.00021 0.02083 0.20346 7.88614 −
Banks −0.00130 −0.00041 0.02146 0.14363 7.60419 −
FTSE world europe −0.00031 0.00035 0.01571 0.24203 9.53506 −
ex fin.
VStoxx 0.03816 −0.05000 2.32303 1.91601 28.77801 +
IR−Level −0.00092 0.00128 0.13345 −0.17983 1.99636 −
Swap Spread 0.00055 0.00100 0.02440 0.61572 24.85393 +
Notes: Statistics for independent variables in Equation (1) from 1 January 2006 until 30 January 2009 (779 daily
observations for each sector). Lagged iBoxx Corporate Bond Index ASW Spreads (ASWt−1) are not included, as
their statistics are similar to the values already presented in Table 1. The stock market index returns are daily log returns
(ln(stock indext/stock indext−1)), VStoxx represents daily VStoxx index changes (VStoxxt − VStoxxt−1), IR_Level
is the first principal component of a PCA using daily changes of 10 Euro swap interest rates for maturities of 1–10 years
as input, and Swap spread exhibits daily changes in the difference of the 5-year European swap interest rate and the
yield of German government bonds of the same maturity (Swap spreadt − Swap spreadt−1).
4. Results
4.1 Determinants of ASW spreads in different market regimes
Results of the Markov switching regressions are provided in Table 3. As expected, the results
suggest that regimes affect the intercept, coefficients, and the volatility of the process. The majority
of all sectors exhibit a negative autocorrelation during the second (low volatility, therefore, calm)
regime and a positive autocorrelation in times of high volatility (turbulent regime), indicating
that the data generating process consists of a mixture of different distributions. The positive
autocorrelation effect in the more volatile regime is particularly pronounced for automobile and
parts, AAA-rated corporates as well as for finance-related indexes. The residual volatility (Std.
Dev.) is higher during turbulent than during calm market periods for all sample sectors. On
average, the residual volatility is 5.4 times higher during the turbulent periods, ranging from five
(e.g. chemicals, utilities, telecommunications) to seven (Tier 1 Capital) times.
Stock market returns are not significantly related to ASW spread changes of the non-financial
sector index, neither in turbulent nor in the calm regimes. There are, however, some important
industry differences within the Non-financial sector. For example, food and beverages as well as
Utilities exhibit a negative association between credit spreads and stock market returns in both
regimes, as predicted by structural models (hypothesis 1). In the regressions for the Financials
composite index, the stock market return coefficients are negative (and statistically significant at
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Table 3. Results of Markov switching regressions.
Stock Swap State
const. ASWt−1 return VStoxx IR−Level Spread Std. dev. pii duration
Automobiles and parts
Turbulent 0.0087∗∗ 0.3532∗∗ −1.2998 0.4315∗∗ −5.9386∗∗ 32.6251∗∗ 110.8669 0.8705 7.72
(3.04) (6.65) (−0.44) (8.60) (−3.36) (3.53)
Calm 0.0001 −0.0945∗∗ −11.629∗∗ −0.0913 −2.1758∗∗ 1.1762 16.2370 0.9551 22.26
(0.10) (−4.49) (−2.65) (−1.76) (−4.17) (0.54)
Chemicals
Turbulent 0.0071 −0.0790 8.0676 0.2692 −4.9517 16.6294 85.2649 0.9237 13.11
(1.06) (−0.58) (0.15) (1.62) (−0.52) (0.43)
Calm 0.0008 −0.1514 −13.7743 −0.0012 −1.7942∗∗ 0.9236 17.4629 0.9728 36.74
(0.20) (−0.71) (−0.67) (−0.02) (−3.61) (0.06)
Food and beverages
Turbulent 0.0054 0.0025 −20.944∗∗ 0.3224∗∗ −3.7208∗∗ 21.7357∗ 102.9351 0.8822 8.49
(1.08) (0.07) (−3.64) (6.00) (−4.15) (2.78)
Calm 0.0007∗ −0.1369∗ −23.228∗∗ −0.1020∗∗ −1.2169∗ −2.9104 14.9158 0.9556 22.54
(2.02) (−2.07) (−6.55) (−3.26) (−2.21) (−0.38)
Health care
Turbulent 0.0055∗∗ −0.0890 6.7733 0.2910∗∗ −3.7628∗∗ 15.9705 75.1542 0.8744 7.96
(3.34) (−1.37) (0.30) (4.21) (−3.47) (1.17)
Calm 0.0001 −0.1787∗ −10.8026 −0.0061 −0.6915 1.3854 13.7207 0.9505 20.21
(1.20) (−2.21) (−0.46) (−0.04) (−1.63) (0.32)
Oil and gas
Turbulent 0.0108 0.0344 −20.385∗∗ 0.2052∗∗ −6.1498∗∗ 41.2796∗∗ 112.5837 0.9197 12.45
(1.55) (0.94) (−3.32) (4.30) (−2.83) (4.25)
Calm 0.0012 −0.1990∗ −15.0015 −0.0278 −2.8551∗ 0.7606 22.6032 0.9827 57.92
(1.98) (−2.44) (−1.17) (−0.41) (−2.26) (0.38)
Personal and household goods
Turbulent 0.0089∗ −0.0870 23.8413 0.2644∗ −4.8654∗ 17.2511 78.8854 0.8963 9.64
(2.38) (−1.39) (1.05) (2.48) (−2.40) (1.50)
Calm −0.0001 −0.0677∗ −9.8711∗ −0.0226 −1.1003∗∗ 3.2185 14.3114 0.9563 22.87
(−0.35) (−2.02) (−2.10) (−0.51) (−2.68) (1.02)
Retail
Turbulent 0.0094∗ 0.0077 20.2265 0.2877∗ −3.5028 22.7682 90.9326 0.8829 8.54
(2.01) (0.11) (0.93) (2.35) (−1.71) (1.82)
Calm 0.0005 −0.0733∗ −12.393∗∗ −0.0016 −1.8851∗∗ 0.5360 15.6158 0.9561 22.77
(1.16) (−2.28) (−3.14) (−0.04) (−4.70) (0.18)
Telecommunications
Turbulent 0.0063 0.0731 −2.5538 0.2558 −3.9102 18.9734 81.7654 0.9167 12.01
(1.51) (1.05) (−0.10) (1.88) (−1.83) (1.46)
Calm 0.0005 −0.0150 −2.4146 0.0375 −1.4312∗∗ 3.2672 16.7733 0.9687 31.99
(0.95) (−0.41) (−0.51) (0.91) (−3.25) (1.03)
Utility
Turbulent 0.0078 −0.1778∗∗ −22.661∗∗ 0.0412 −4.9167∗ 0.1832 75.7516 0.9146 11.70
(1.30) (−2.86) (−5.52) (1.30) (−2.43) (0.04)
Calm 0.0004∗ −0.1468∗∗ −17.067∗∗ −0.0436 −1.0210 −0.3179 15.6115 0.9719 35.53
(2.45) (−5.70) (−2.84) (−0.75) (−0.97) (−0.45)
Corporates AAA
Turbulent 0.0056 0.2873∗∗ 3.6822 0.2858 −3.2080 52.8956∗∗ 115.4664 0.9217 12.77
(1.30) (13.4) (0.03) (0.65) (−0.85) (3.27)
Calm 0.0008∗∗ −0.2699∗∗ −17.7525∗ −0.1043∗ −1.5183∗∗ −2.8673 16.8719 0.9827 57.82
(2.86) (−3.23) (−2.17) (−2.43) (−2.93) (−0.81)
(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued
Stock Swap State
const. ASWt−1 return VStoxx IR−Level Spread Std. dev. pii duration
Corporates AA
Turbulent 0.0067∗∗ 0.0579 −12.4094 0.1690∗∗ −4.7488∗∗ 36.1258∗∗ 71.1397 0.8873 8.88
(4.27) (1.16) (−1.15) (4.60) (−5.72) (3.49)
Calm 0.0005∗ −0.1470 −14.7228 −0.0247 −1.6224∗∗ −0.9396 12.3050 0.9454 18.31
(2.06) (−0.70) (−0.85) (−0.33) (−9.36) (−0.26)
Corporates A
Turbulent 0.0106∗∗ 0.0798 −30.1514∗ 0.0993 −3.8684∗ 32.1492∗∗ 73.1683 0.9057 10.60
(3.60) (1.79) (−2.53) (1.71) (−2.45) (5.98)
Calm 0.0013∗∗ −0.0497 −38.5933∗∗ −0.2036∗ −1.5196∗∗ 2.5043 14.7798 0.9625 26.66
(3.12) (−0.17) (−4.37) (−2.62) (−4.44) (0.71)
Corporates BBB
Turbulent 0.0129∗ 0.1064 −30.6951 0.1754 −3.0372 27.2616∗ 85.3892 0.9008 10.08
(2.69) (1.75) (−1.22) (1.26) (−1.40) (2.31)
Calm 0.0011∗ 0.0372 −37.6421∗∗ −0.2341∗∗ −1.8140∗∗ 5.6972 16.2048 0.9641 27.88
(2.21) (1.02) (−4.52) (−3.98) (−3.82) (1.95)
Corporates senior
Turbulent 0.0072∗ 0.0533 −22.9137 0.1612 −3.5763 29.7785∗∗ 68.5249 0.9156 11.85
(2.19) (0.82) (−1.04) (1.11) (−1.96) (3.65)
Calm 0.0006 −0.1486∗∗ −21.3212∗∗ −0.1119∗ −1.5390∗∗ 1.9404 13.2823 0.9659 29.31
(1.57) (−3.85) (−3.43) (−2.40) (−3.99) (0.72)
Corporates subordinated
Turbulent 0.0125∗∗ 0.2536∗∗ −25.0488 0.0315 −3.7312∗ 38.9976∗∗ 65.7289 0.9514 20.58
(4.44) (5.81) (−1.36) (0.23) (−2.40) (7.41)
Calm 0.0015∗∗ −0.1271∗∗ −57.1431∗∗ −0.2574∗∗ −0.9427 3.5802 13.4608 0.9593 24.58
(3.21) (−3.65) (−6.29) (−4.06) (−1.92) (1.16)
Corporates composite
Turbulent 0.0095∗∗ 0.0632 −21.1703 0.1647 −4.0552∗ 32.0181∗∗ 67.7992 0.9150 11.76
(2.95) (1.05) (−0.97) (1.05) (−2.21) (4.24)
Calm 0.0009∗ −0.0626 −30.6173∗∗ −0.1553∗∗ −1.4657∗∗ 3.1737 13.9057 0.9652 28.75
(2.29) (−1.66) (−4.95) (−3.79) (−3.88) (1.12)
Non-financials
Turbulent 0.0079∗ 0.0430 −11.6668 0.2103 −3.7366 17.7671 73.4352 0.9167 12.01
(2.33) (0.54) (−0.75) (1.75) (−1.89) (1.49)
Calm 0.0004 −0.1578∗∗ −2.4209 −0.0345 −1.6864∗∗ 2.3315 14.2543 0.9674 30.65
(0.80) (−2.74) (−0.57) (−0.64) (−3.78) (0.91)
Financials
Turbulent 0.0085 0.2071∗ 4.5976 0.2377 −3.9571∗ 48.7543∗∗ 61.6147 0.9245 13.24
(1.81) (2.33) (0.35) (1.98) (−2.29) (3.14)
Calm 0.0008 −0.1671 −21.7275∗ −0.0940 −1.4653 1.7697 11.6361 0.9471 18.91
(0.92) (−1.49) (−2.03) (−0.97) (−1.11) (0.34)
Financials senior
Turbulent 0.0071∗ 0.2167∗∗ 8.1620 0.3798∗ −4.7083∗∗ 60.5424∗∗ 72.1853 0.8483 6.59
(2.24) (2.95) (0.64) (2.19) (−3.00) (4.09)
Calm 0.0007 −0.1514 1.0613 0.0671∗∗ −1.7790∗∗ 2.2155 12.6594 0.9395 16.54
(1.34) (−1.24) (0.76) (3.15) (−6.43) (0.57)
Financials subordinated
Turbulent 0.0130∗∗ 0.2547∗∗ 2.8750 0.1561 −4.5369∗∗ 42.3740∗∗ 65.8223 0.9520 20.85
(4.69) (4.85) (0.24) (1.59) (−2.91) (4.91)
Calm 0.0013∗ −0.1265∗ −39.6987∗∗ −0.1838∗ −1.0896 3.0546 13.2163 0.9599 24.92
(2.51) (−2.38) (−5.11) (−2.37) (−1.96) (0.86)
(Continued)
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Table 3. Continued
Stock Swap State
const. ASWt−1 return VStoxx IR−Level Spread Std. dev. pii duration
Banks
Turbulent 0.0095∗∗ 0.1238∗ 12.2365 0.2895∗ −4.4491∗ 44.2449∗∗ 70.7211 0.9091 11.00
(2.78) (2.05) (0.73) (2.20) (−2.49) (6.25)
Calm 0.0009∗ −0.1434∗∗ −17.7257∗∗ −0.0974∗∗ −1.6054∗∗ 1.2231 12.0942 0.9450 18.20
(2.37) (−4.10) (−5.28) (−2.72) (−4.21) (0.43)
Tier 1 Capital
Turbulent 0.0180 0.5154∗∗ −65.3662∗∗ −0.0783 0.7569 47.8202∗∗ 118.6375 0.9329 14.90
(1.35) (8.7) (−2.85) (−0.51) (0.26) (7.39)
Calm 0.0014 −0.0646 −74.4322 −0.3402 −0.0774 2.1095 17.1272 0.9491 19.65
(0.68) (−0.96) (−1.39) (−0.65) (−0.06) (1.11)
Lower Tier 2 Capital
Turbulent 0.0106∗∗ 0.0555 −14.3953 0.0985∗∗ −4.7018 22.6938∗∗ 63.8301 0.9510 20.39
(3.21) (0.76) (−1.55) (3.56) (−1.77) (5.71)
Calm 0.0010∗∗ −0.1613∗∗ −35.8535∗∗ −0.1566 −0.9703∗ 0.7634 11.6346 0.9609 25.60
(4.22) (−2.71) (−2.97) (−1.52) (−2.63) (0.52)
Notes: Results for the Markov switching regression of changes in European iBoxx Corporate Bond IndexASW spreads on
theoretical determinants. We report regression coefficients and corresponding z-statistics (in parentheses). The results are
based on a Newey–West consistent estimate of the covariance matrix to control for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.
The theoretical determinants are: lagged ASW changes (ASWt−1), daily stock index returns (Stock return), the change
in the VStoxx volatility index VStoxx, the change in the level of the swap curve (IR_Level), and the difference of
the swap and the German government yield curve (Swap Spread). The regime- (turbulent and calm) dependent residual
standard deviation (Std. Dev.) is in annualized basis points. pii gives the probability of staying in the respective regime.
The regime-dependent State Duration is in days.
∗Significance at the 5% level.
∗∗Significance at the 1% level.
the 5% level or better) only during calm periods. This is further confirmed by the negative and
highly statistically significant coefficients in regressions for Subordinated Financials, Banks, and
Lower Tier 2 Capital indexes. For these indexes, increasing stock returns in calm periods are
strongly associated with lower ASW spreads.
Furthermore, the VStoxx is not significantly related to ASW spreads of Financial and Non-
financial indexes, both in calm and turbulent periods (hypothesis 2). There is, however, evidence
that volatility positively influencesASW spreads especially in the turbulent regime.22 For example,
in all but 1 out of 23 regressions the coefficient for volatility is positive, and in 10 out of 23 regres-
sions significant at the 5% level or better. Notably, for three indexes (food and beverages, banks,
and financial subordinates) we report a negative and statistically significant association between
volatility and credit spreads during calm periods.23 The negative and statistically significant rela-
tion between volatility and credit spreads during calm periods is also observed for the Corporates
Composite index, in almost all credit rating (CorporatesAAA, CorporatesA and Corporates BBB)
and seniority classes (Corporates Senior and Corporate Subordinate). The reported negative asso-
ciation of the ASW spreads and stock market volatility during calm periods is consistent with
Alexander and Keack (2008) who report a negative association of CDS spreads and volatility
in calm regime for Non-financials (statistically significant at the 5% level) and Financial senior
sectors (not statistically significant). Cremers et al. (2008) also report a significantly negative
impact of implied market volatility on credit spreads of 69 US firms. Overall, the results suggests
that credit spreads tend to be more affected by stock market returns during calm periods, while in
turbulent periods stock market volatility becomes a more important determinant of credit spreads.
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Interest rate level changes (IR_Levelt) affect ASW spreads negatively in both regimes
(hypothesis 3).24 Table 3 also reveals larger negative coefficients for interest rate level changes
(IR_Levelt) in turbulent compared to calm regimes. Thus, decreasing interest rates in turbulent
periods tend to increase spreads more in calm periods. This result contradicts findings for CDS
spreads reported by Alexander and Kaeck (2008) who report a negative and statistically signif-
icant relation between interest rates and credit spreads only during calm periods. In addition,
they report lack of statistically significant relation between interest rates and credit spreads for
financial indexes (Financial senior and Financial subordinate).25
Finally, the influence of swap spreads (Swap Spreadt) is positive, with extremely large coeffi-
cients, in all regressions during turbulent periods (hypothesis 4). In 16 out of 23 cases, the positive
coefficients are significant at the 5% level, or better. The swap spreads, however, do not have a
strong effect on credit spreads during calm periods. For example, none of the 19 coefficients for
Swap Spreadt with a positive sign are statistically significant in calm periods. This evidence
is in line with our prediction that the liquidity premium plays a particularly important role in
turbulent periods.
The reported high probabilities of staying in respective regimes suggest significant market
persistency. The persistency tends to be higher for calm regimes. For example, once in a calm
regime Financials have a probability of 95% of remaining in the calm regime. The correspond-
ing probability for the turbulent regime is 92%. The respective probabilities for Non-financials
indexes are 97% and 92%, respectively. The above results are consistent with reported longer
state durations for calm compared to turbulent periods. For example, for Financials indexes the
estimated duration of calm periods is 19 days compared to 13 days for turbulent periods. The
corresponding values for Non-Financials indexes are 31 and 12 days, respectively.
Unreported results for regime-specific moments of ASW spreads suggest that ASW spreads
changes deviated much more from normal distribution in the turbulent regime.26 The length of
time (in percentage terms) with characteristics of the high volatility regime varies across indexes.
For example, the mean values for non-financial and financial sectors are 26.8% and 39.3%,
respectively.
4.2 Equality of coefficients in different market regimes
Engel and Hamilton (1990) suggest a classical log likelihood ratio test with the null hypothesis
(H0) of no switching in the coefficients (βSt=1 and βSt=2) but allow for switching in the residual
variance (σSt=1 and σSt=2).27 Thus we test the following hypothesis:
H0 : βSt=1,j = βSt=2,j for all j, σSt=1 = σSt=2. (6)
Unreported results suggest that the null hypothesis of equal coefficients in both regimes can be
rejected for all 23 sectors at the 5% level.28 Overall, indexes for financial industry provide most
evidence of regime switching.29 This contradicts findings documented in Alexander and Kaeck
(2008), reporting no evidence of switching in at least one of the coefficients in the Financial
Senior index. The above specification test could be affected by a high degree of correlation
between explanatory variables. In our sample, the two variables with the highest correlation are
the equity market variables (i.e. stock returns and VStoxx). Our (unreported) results for the
Markov switching models with only one of the two stock market variables remain robust.30
We further conduct a test for switching in each explanatory variable of model 1 (see Table 4).
As expected, for the stock market volatility the hypothesis of no switching can be rejected for
22 out of 23 indexes (at the 5% level). Evidence for switching in other explanatory variables
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Table 4. Test of equality of coefficients for individual explanatory variables in different market regimes.
ASWt−1 Stock returnt−1 VStoxxt−1 IR−Levelt−1 Swap Spreadt−1
LR p-Value LR p-Value LR p-Value LR p-Value LR p-Value
Automobiles and parts 30.454 0.000 0.000 0.989 17.497 0.000 3.137 0.077 1.226 0.268
Chemicals 0.307 0.580 1.929 0.165 5.388 0.020 3.185 0.074 1.906 0.167
Food and beverages 0.776 0.378 8.396 0.004 16.898 0.000 3.978 0.046 3.895 0.048
Health care 0.494 0.482 2.751 0.097 11.109 0.001 5.218 0.022 2.755 0.097
Oil and gas 6.645 0.010 9.828 0.002 10.411 0.001 4.416 0.036 4.416 0.036
Personal and household goods 0.204 0.652 1.490 0.222 6.055 0.014 4.203 0.040 3.516 0.061
Retail 0.675 0.411 0.708 0.400 5.146 0.023 1.097 0.295 3.975 0.046
Telecommunications 0.418 0.518 5.013 0.025 8.584 0.003 3.636 0.057 3.269 0.071
Utility 0.077 0.781 2.903 0.088 3.318 0.069 5.598 0.018 0.624 0.429
Corporates AAA 30.711 0.000 7.526 0.006 11.639 0.001 0.330 0.566 8.397 0.004
Corporates AA 0.511 0.475 12.920 0.000 12.145 0.000 5.485 0.019 13.321 0.000
Corporates A1 0.243 0.622 14.477 0.000 16.050 0.000 4.683 0.030 12.991 0.000
Corporates BBB 0.754 0.385 13.772 0.000 17.782 0.000 2.531 0.112 7.555 0.006
Corporates senior 1.874 0.171 17.135 0.000 18.722 0.000 5.098 0.024 10.295 0.001
Corporates subordinated 34.027 0.000 10.591 0.001 13.093 0.000 8.239 0.004 13.381 0.000
Corporates composite 0.872 0.350 17.634 0.000 20.452 0.000 6.161 0.013 13.736 0.000
Non-financials 2.027 0.155 12.857 0.000 14.679 0.000 5.017 0.025 4.007 0.045
Financials 8.526 0.004 12.016 0.001 13.687 0.000 5.468 0.019 24.598 0.000
Financials senior 5.286 0.021 15.069 0.000 17.316 0.000 4.307 0.038 24.171 0.000
Financials subordinated 35.945 0.000 3.803 0.051 8.872 0.003 8.318 0.004 11.633 0.001
Banks 5.426 0.020 8.280 0.004 12.920 0.000 4.983 0.026 19.644 0.000
Tier 1 capital 82.531 0.000 11.236 0.001 9.515 0.002 1.547 0.214 8.585 0.003
Lower Tier 2 capital 10.037 0.002 8.765 0.003 10.012 0.002 10.304 0.001 5.522 0.019
Notes: The theoretical determinants are: lagged squared ASW changes (ASW2t−1), lagged ASW changes (ASWt−1), lagged daily stock index returns (Stock returnt−1), lagged
change in the VStoxx volatility index (VStoxxt−1), lagged change in the level of the swap curve (IR−Levelt−1), and lagged changes in the difference of the swap and the
German government yield curve (Swap Spreadt−1). Likelihood ratio (LR) statistic and corresponding p-values.
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varies across industries. For example, automobiles and parts, chemicals, personal and household
goods, and utility do not exhibit regime switching neither in the stock market returns nor in
swap spreads. Instead, these sectors are more likely to experience regime switching in interest
rates.31 Automobiles and parts, oil and gas, and banks are the only industry sectors that exhibit
strong regime switching in the coefficient for lagged-dependent variable. The above results provide
further evidence for different time-varying behaviour of ASW spreads across different industries.
4.3 Tested-down Markov model
After clearly providing evidence of switching in the variables in most of the industry indexes we
tested the Markov model down in the following way. First, we run the model with all variables (as
in Table 3). Second, we perform a series of constrained estimates of the model by fixing the most
insignificant coefficient at zero (i.e. we start with 10 (5 × 2) coefficients and reduce the model
step by step). This procedure is repeated until all (remaining) coefficients are statistically signif-
icant. The final estimate (i.e. the last one in the series of constrained estimates) is then presented
in Table 5.32
Table 5. Results of the tested-down Markov switching regression.
Stock Swap State
const. ASWt−1 return VStoxx IR−Level Spread Std. dev. pii duration
Automobiles and parts
Turbulent 0.0106 0.3488∗∗ 0.4081∗∗ −6.2517∗ 33.6093∗∗ 124.66 0.9068 10.73
(3.26) (6.83) (6.07) (−2.51) (5.68)
Calm 0.0005 −0.1330∗ −8.2786∗ −2.5116∗∗ 19.52 0.9771 43.74
(0.92) (−2.24) (−2.45) (−5.76)
Chemicals
Turbulent 0.0064 0.2844∗∗ −3.9961∗ 84.11 0.9161 11.92
(2.17) (8.04) (−2.31)
Calm 0.0005 0.1343∗ −1.6611∗∗ 16.98 0.9671 30.37
(0.76) (2.16) (−4.38)
Food and beverages
Turbulent 0.0052 −61.1444∗∗ −4.0263∗∗ 25.9251∗∗ 103.54 0.8847 8.67
(1.28) (−5.82) (−3.10) (4.99)
Calm 0.0006 −0.1277∗∗ −13.7668∗∗ −0.9693∗ 14.93 0.9560 22.73
(2.11) (−3.67) (−5.14) (−2.30)
Health care
Turbulent 0.0056 −0.1470∗∗ 0.3123∗∗ −3.6253∗∗ 74.09 0.8807 8.38
(2.02) (−5.19) (9.24) (−3.59)
Calm 0.0001 −0.1885∗∗ 0.0740∗∗ 13.55 0.9500 20.02
(1.76) (−2.67) (5.17)
Oil and gas
Turbulent 0.0115 −21.5173∗∗ 0.2128∗∗ −6.1856∗∗ 39.1652∗∗ 113.57 0.9230 12.99
(1.78) (−3.67) (4.95) (−2.92) (6.03)
Calm 0.0012 −0.1882∗ −3.0221∗∗ 22.92 0.9839 62.05
(1.90) (−2.25) (−2.88)
Personal and household goods
Turbulent 0.0091 −0.1319∗∗ 0.2265∗∗ −4.0582∗ 79.59 0.8946 9.49
(2.45) (−2.63) (3.51) (−2.20)
(Continued)
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Table 5. Continued
Stock Swap State
const. ASWt−1 return VStoxx IR−Level Spread Std. dev. pii duration
Calm −0.0001 −0.0747∗ −8.7683∗ −1.1036∗∗ 14.36 0.9560 22.72
(−0.33) (−2.33) (−2.33) (−2.79)
Retail
Turbulent 0.0098 0.2630∗∗ 91.75 0.8819 8.47
(2.16) (3.63)
Calm 0.0005 −0.0734∗ −12.3535∗∗ −1.9123∗∗ 15.67 0.9562 22.82
(1.18) (−2.41) (−3.88) (−5.02)
Telecommunications
Turbulent 0.0072 0.3294∗∗ −3.6620∗ 82.68 0.9161 11.92
(1.80) (3.98) (−2.10)
Calm 0.0005 −1.6613∗∗ 16.93 0.9691 32.35
(0.99) (−4.25)
Utility
Turbulent 0.0085 −0.1661∗∗ −35.1670∗∗ 77.60 0.9176 12.14
(0.99) (−5.31) (−4.33)
Calm 0.0004 −0.1479∗∗ −15.7598∗∗ 15.87 0.9733 37.51
(0.85) (−2.73) (−3.12)
Corporates AAA
Turbulent 0.0069 0.2337∗∗ 0.4457∗∗ 120.85 0.9222 12.85
(2.45) (10.23) (10.21)
Calm 0.0008 −0.2613∗∗ −16.4217∗ −0.1026∗ −1.4853∗∗ 16.92 0.9829 58.62
(2.78) (−3.54) (−2.00) (−2.13) (−3.68)
Corporates AA
Turbulent 0.0076 0.2429∗ −5.3976∗∗ 36.1874∗∗ 73.18 0.8775 8.16
(2.42) (2.44) (−2.86) (2.61)
Calm 0.0005 −1.8433∗∗ 12.98 0.9462 18.58
(0.98) (−3.92)
Corporates A
Turbulent 0.0116 −46.1475∗∗ −3.8861∗ 27.2963∗∗ 74.65 0.9082 10.89
(3.40) (−3.11) (−2.09) (3.10)
Calm 0.0013 −40.3315∗∗ −0.2037∗∗ −1.4728∗∗ 15.15 0.9654 28.89
(2.92) (−6.09) (−4.11) (−3.63)
Corporates BBB
Turbulent 0.0162 35.3960∗∗ 90.54 0.8960 9.62
(3.79) (3.18)
Calm 0.0011 −37.9072∗∗ −0.2362∗∗ −1.9257∗∗ 16.29 0.9635 27.37
(2.07) (−4.02) (−3.07) (−4.09)
Corporates senior
Turbulent 0.0081 0.2706∗∗ −4.3227∗∗ 28.9963∗∗ 68.86 0.9142 11.65
(2.53) (3.11) (−2.75) (4.06)
Calm 0.0006 −0.1584∗∗ −23.4193∗∗ −0.1246∗∗ −1.5564∗∗ 13.32 0.9656 29.05
(1.63) (−4.32) (−3.99) (−3.07) (−4.11)
Corporates subordinated
Turbulent 0.0125 0.2665∗∗ −5.0357∗∗ 46.8321∗∗ 66.05 0.9500 19.98
(4.43) (6.16) (−4.28) (9.71)
Calm 0.0014 −0.1398∗∗ −58.6783∗∗ −0.2622∗∗ 13.44 0.9579 23.77
(3.26) (−4.04) (−6.56) (−4.10)
Corporates composite
Turbulent 0.0095 −6.0490∗∗ 45.5067∗∗ 69.51 0.9131 11.50
(2.86) (−3.88) (6.18)
(Continued)
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Table 5. Continued
Stock Swap State
const. ASWt−1 return VStoxx IR−Level Spread Std. dev. pii duration
Calm 0.0010 −0.0873∗∗ −33.8628∗∗ −0.1716∗∗ −1.4934∗∗ 14.03 0.9652 28.70
(2.39) (−2.41) (−5.36) (−3.91) (−4.23)
Non-financials
Turbulent 0.0086 0.2784∗∗ −4.3234∗ 73.59 0.9154 11.82
(2.44) (3.03) (−2.29)
Calm 0.0003 −0.1705∗∗ −1.7253∗∗ 14.26 0.9669 30.21
(0.68) (−3.46) (−3.75)
Financials
Turbulent 0.0084 0.2059∗ 0.2141∗∗ −3.8181∗ 47.8193∗∗ 61.54 0.9257 13.45
(3.32) (2.47) (2.77) (−2.33) (3.57)
Calm 0.0009 −0.1700∗∗ 11.69 0.9478 19.14
(1.43) (−3.23)
Financials senior
Turbulent 0.0068 0.2207∗∗ 0.3154∗ −4.4264∗∗ 59.4865∗∗ 72.05 0.8503 6.68
(2.45) (2.88) (2.37) (−3.68) (4.54)
Calm 0.0007 −1.7846∗∗ 12.63 0.9397 16.59
(1.19) (−5.33)
Financials subordinated
Turbulent 0.0119 0.2815∗∗ 0.1870∗∗ 42.1414∗∗ 64.26 0.9572 23.34
(5.53) (5.66) (2.62) (5.45)
Calm 0.0008 −0.1310∗ −24.1943∗∗ 12.10 0.9570 23.23
(2.19) (−2.26) (−7.18)
Banks
Turbulent 0.0091 0.1282∗ 0.2233∗ −4.0385∗ 42.1141∗∗ 70.91 0.9081 10.89
(2.71) (2.17) (2.19) (−2.40) (6.40)
Calm 0.0009 −0.1488∗∗ −16.2230∗∗ −0.0883∗ −1.6226∗∗ 12.13 0.9450 18.19
(2.48) (−4.34) (−4.98) (−2.51) (−4.41)
Tier 1 Capital
Turbulent 0.0171 0.5128∗∗ −53.3296∗∗ 47.5036∗∗ 114.92 0.9449 18.16
(1.33) (8.06) (−7.89) (7.99)
Calm 0.0010 −40.1955∗ 15.98 0.9516 20.65
(0.37) (−2.20)
Lower Tier 2 Capital
Turbulent 0.0114 0.1637∗ −5.2584∗∗ 21.3912∗∗ 64.02 0.9505 20.21
(4.95) (2.20) (−3.74) (2.81)
Calm 0.0010 −0.1628∗∗ −36.4149∗∗ −0.1590∗ −0.9657∗ 11.65 0.9607 25.47
(2.73) (−3.47) (−4.09) (−2.16) (−2.27)
Notes: Results for the tested-down Markov switching regression of changes in European iBoxx Bond Index ASW
Spreads on theoretical determinants. We report regression coefficients and corresponding z-statistics (in parentheses).
The results are based on a Newey–West consistent estimate of the covariance matrix to control for autocorrelation and
heteroscedasticity. The theoretical determinants are: lagged ASW changes (ASWt−1), daily stock index returns (Stock
return), the change in the VStoxx volatility index (VStoxx), the change in the level of the swap curve (IR_Level),
and the difference of the swap and the German government yield curve (Swap Spread). The regime-dependent residual
standard deviation (Std. Dev.) is in annualized basis points. pii gives the probability of staying in the respective regime.
The regime-dependent State Duration is in days.
∗Significance at the 5% level.
∗∗Significance at the 1% level.
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The results further highlight industry variations. For example, automobiles and parts, most
financial indexes, and AAA corporates exhibit positive autocorrelation in turbulent and negative
in calm periods. On the other hand, health care, personal and household goods, and utilities exhibit
significant negative autocorrelation in both regimes, with very similar coefficients. Whilst stock
market returns tend to be the main determinant during calm periods, stock market volatility tends
to be the key determinant during turbulent periods. Swap spreads appear to be an excellent proxy
for bond market liquidity, since it is highly significant in turbulent periods and not significant
during calm periods. Interest rates are an important determinant of ASW spreads in both regimes
and most sectors (exceptions are retail, health care, and utilities). Notably, interest rates remain
an important determinant of ASW spreads in the banking sector in both regimes.
Our findings suggest significant differences in the importance of regimes across various indus-
tries. For example, the results for the banking sector are very much different from the results for
utilities. While differences in estimates across regimes are very different in banking, they are not
significant for utilities. Our findings also suggest significant differences in the importance of stock
market returns, changes in volatility and changes in interest rates for explainingASW spreads from
various industries. For example,ASW spreads in the utility as well as the food and beverage sectors
are not significantly affected by equity volatility in any of the regimes. On contrary, ASW spreads
in all other industries are significantly affected by equity volatility during turbulent regimes.
There are also significant differences in the results across credit ratings. For example, the
autocorrelation is more significant (in both regimes) for AAA bond indexes than for BBB indexes.
Furthermore, the swap spread has no significant influence on AAA bonds, opposite to bonds in
lower rating classes.
5. Economic identification of regimes and drivers of regime changes
5.1 Economic identification of regimes
So far, we defined the turbulent and calm regimes based on statistical procedures and resulting
differences in coefficients, residuals’ volatility, probability of staying in the respective regime,
state duration, and ASW spreads’ regime-specific moments. It is important to investigate to what
extent our model estimates correspond to economic events and whether the turbulent regime
indeed relates to the events from the recent financial crisis.
In the presence of regime switching, we expect a positive relation between volatility of ASW
spread changes and filtered probabilities of entering into a turbulent period. Furthermore, we
expect that the filtered probabilities relate to dates of major events during our sample period. We,
therefore, plot the major events together with estimated probabilities and squared ASW spread
changes (see Figure 2). In this way, we undertake economic identification of regimes identified
by our Markov model (Equation (5)).
The selected events are: (1) first reports on a sharp drop in US house prices, (2) the Ameriquest
crisis, (3) financial markets rallied to a 5-year high, (4) the credit markets crisis, (5) LIBOR rose
to 6.79%; (6) the collapse of Bear Stearns, (7) the nationalization of Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae, (8) the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and (9) the Citigroup crisis. The above events reflect
the fact that the recent credit crisis originated in the US housing and mortgage markets and then
spread to Europe and beyond.33
Figure 2 depicts a positive association between the probability of being in the volatile regime
and ASW spread volatility and exhibits consistency with selected events. As expected, the spikes
marking an increase in ASW volatility (black line) correspond to high probabilities of entering
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Figure 2. Estimated regime probabilities and volatility ofASW spreads for the corporates composite portfolio.
Notes: Estimated probability of being in the volatile regime – based on the filtered probability (grey bars and
left scale: a value of 100% indicates being in the turbulent regime, a value of zero being in the calm regime)
and squared changes in the iBoxx Corporate Composite ASW spread (black line and right scale; bps). The
events are: (1) The report indicating US house price stagnation, (2) Ameriquest crisis, (3) markets rallied to
a 5-year high, (4) credit markets freeze, (5) LIBOR reached 6.79%, (6) Bear Stearns collapse, (7) Freddie
Mac and Fannie Mae nationalization, (8) Lehman Brothers collapse, and (9) Citigroup crisis.
into a turbulent period (grey line). For example, the US housing bubble bursted when housing
prices started to flatten and eventually dropped in the first quarter of 2006 (see event 1 in Figure 2).
Consequently, the first three months of our sample period exhibit high volatility together with a
high probability of entering into a turbulent period. The financial crisis escalated as Ameriquest
Mortgage revealed plans to close its retail branches and announced significant job cuts in May
2006 (see event 2 in Figure 2). In November 2006, markets rallied to a 5-year high leading to an
ASW spread reduction of 7 basis points (see event 3 in Figure 2). Another volatile period started
when credit markets froze in summer 2007. In a coordinated move with the Federal Reserve, the
European Central Bank injected ¤95 billion into the European banking systems (see event 4 in
Figure 2). At the end of August 2007, Ameriquest Mortgage finally went out of business. On 4
September 2007, LIBOR rates rose to 6.79%, the highest level since 1998 (see event 5 in Figure 2).
During the following four months ASW spreads returned to the calm regime lasting until the stock
market downturn in January 2008. Bear Stearns (at that time the fifth largest investment bank in
the world) was on the verge of collapse before it was sold to rival JP Morgan on 16 March 2008
(see event 6 in Figure 2). The takeover was marked by the jump in the Corporate Composite
ASW spread of 33 basis points within the first 11 trading days in March 2008 (with a maximum
daily change of 19.15 basis points). For the following five months, our sample entered the volatile
regime only occasionally. During this period Indymac Bank was placed into receivership by the
Office of Thrift Supervision.
As indicated by the estimated probabilities, from August 2008 we basically remain in the
turbulent regime until the end of our sample period. Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were nationalized
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at the beginning of September 2008 (see event 7 in Figure 2). Around the same time rumors about
liquidity problems of Lehman Brothers surfaced and Lehman filed for bankruptcy protection on
15 September 2008. This event marks the peak of the financial crisis (see event 8 in Figure 2). For
example, within 23 trading days the Corporate Composite ASW spread exploded by 144 basis
points. The highest single day jump (of 17.4 points) in this period was on 16 September 2008.
Days later it became public that AIG was on the brink of bankruptcy, causing the ASW spread
to increase nearly 16 basis points within a day. The last and largest spike in our sample credit
spreads occurred on 21 November 2008. Due to liquidity problems of Citigroup (see event 9
in Figure 2), the value of the Corporate Composite ASW spread jumped by 20.06 basis points.
The market capitalization of the once biggest bank in the world dropped by 60% within a week.
Finally, the US government agreed to invest several billion dollars and save the system-relevant
financial institution. The remaining trading days in our sample exhibit a high level of volatility, as
the downturn on financial markets continued. Overall, the estimation results presented in Figure 2,
provide robust conclusion that our turbulent regime is indeed related to the events from the recent
financial crisis.
5.2 Determinants of regime changes
Having demonstrated significant regime changes, we now examine main drivers of the regime
changes. To statistically test variables that induce a regime shift, we estimate a logit model
relating the estimated state probability of being in either of the regimes to structural variables.
The dependent variable is, therefore, equal to one if the estimated probability from Equation (5) is
higher than 0.5 (indicating a high volatility – turbulent regime) and equal to zero if the estimated
probability value is equal to or lower than 0.5 (indicating a low volatility – calm regime). The
explanatory variables are the same structural variables as in Equation (5), with an addition of
the squared change of lagged ASW spreads (ASW2t−1). Given that volatility of ASW spreads
is expected to be high during turbulent regimes (i.e. when volatility of residuals is high) it is
important to examine the causality between regime changes and the volatility of ASW spreads
(proxied by ASW2t−1). The model, thus, has the following form:34
Pt = P
[
yt = 1
] = 1
1 + e−(α0+α1xt−1) , (7)
where Pt[yt = 1] denotes the filtered probability of being in the high volatile regime at time t and
α0 and α1 represent regression coefficients. Various models are estimated using only one lagged
explanatory variable xt−1 at a time.
The ASW2t−1 column in Table 6 reveals that large changes in the volatility of credit spreads,
irrespective of the direction, lead to a shift in market regimes.35 The coefficients are statistically
significant at the 5% or better in 18 (of 23) regressions. Results presented in the second column
in Table 6 show that lagged changes of credit spreads (ASWt−1) have a significant and positive
influence on the regime probability (the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% or
better in 21 (of 23) regressions). As expected, stock market returns have a negative sign in all
sectors (statistically significant in 8 cases), indicating that positive daily market returns reduce
the probability of switching to the high volatility regime. In contrast, lagged changes in volatility
(VStoxxt−1) do not seem to have any influence on the switching behaviour. The level of interest
rates (IR_Level), on the other hand, is negatively associated with credit spreads in all sectors
(but statistically significant only in 3 cases). The coefficients for the lagged swap spreads are not
statistically significant.
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Table 6. Logit models for drivers of regime shifts.
ASW2t−1 ASWt−1 Stock returnt−1 VStoxxt−1 IR−Levelt−1 Swap Spreadt−1
Automobiles and parts
0.0215 0.0592∗ −3.7964 0.0296 −1.6002∗ 4.6729
(1.3180) (2.1888) (−0.7337) (0.5576) (−2.0504) (0.9468)
[0.0963] [0.0115] [0.0019] [0.0008] [0.0074] [0.0021]
Chemicals
0.3505∗∗ 0.0662 −12.2542 0.0264 −1.3362 0.1193
(10.103) (1.7370) (−1.7548) (0.5267) (−1.7605) (0.0264)
[0.4121] [0.0072] [0.0072] [0.0006] [0.0053] [0.0000]
Food and beverages
0.1033 0.0648∗ −15.3480 0.0661 −1.3118 4.8336
(1.1110) (2.0746) (−1.9482) (1.4352) (−1.7492) (1.0914)
[0.2002] [0.0100] [0.0072] [0.0040] [0.0051] [0.0023]
Health Care
0.4450∗∗ 0.0860∗ −9.5170 0.0164 −1.0351 2.8991
(10.178) (2.1145) (−1.2537) (0.3435) (−1.4359) (0.6898)
[0.4074] [0.0099] [0.0032] [0.0002] [0.0032] [0.0008]
Oil and gas
0.1564∗∗ 0.1143∗ −9.0381 0.0570 −1.6222 5.3706
(10.380) (2.2407) (−0.9860) (0.8961) (−1.5414) (0.8895)
[0.4072] [0.0268] [0.0047] [0.0030] [0.0068] [0.0027]
Personal and household goods
0.5183∗∗ 0.0998∗∗ −14.1169∗ 0.0381 −0.8799 1.8637
(10.972) (2.6050) (−1.9619) (0.8170) (−1.2257) (0.4393)
[0.4659] [0.0152] [0.0079] [0.0013] [0.0023] [0.0003]
Retail
0.4002∗∗ 0.0915∗∗ −3.5135 0.0405 −1.0232 −0.0906
(9.8899) (2.6755) (−0.4828) (0.8210) (−1.3132) (−0.0194)
[0.4777] [0.0161] [0.0004] [0.0015] [0.0031] [0.0000]
Telecommunications
0.4030∗∗ 0.0793∗ −13.2334 0.0412 −1.6271∗ 2.3138
(9.1460) (2.1298) (−1.6666) (0.8575) (−2.1035) (0.5159)
[0.4471] [0.0101] [0.0057] [0.0015] [0.0078] [0.0005]
Utility
0.4437∗∗ 0.0963∗ −8.2295 0.0398 −0.9558 2.8419
(11.264) (1.9925) (−1.0364) (0.7856) (−1.1490) (0.5848)
[0.4465] [0.0114] [0.0031] [0.0014] [0.0026] [0.0007]
Corporates AAA
0.2820∗∗ 0.0580 −12.4132 0.0249 −1.9375∗ 2.0945
(8.4606) (1.6561) (−1.2783) (0.3708) (−2.0579) (0.3538)
[0.4021] [0.0086] [0.0058] [0.0005] [0.0105] [0.0004]
Corporates AA
0.4806∗∗ 0.1077∗∗ −16.7895∗ 0.0724 −0.7876 0.1266
(7.3090) (2.5942) (−2.4332) (1.8124) (−1.1660) (0.0326)
[0.3798] [0.0157] [0.0112] [0.0048] [0.0019] [0.0000]
Corporates A
0.4426∗∗ 0.1512∗∗ −10.4261 0.0206 −0.7296 0.6953
(10.785) (3.4699) (−1.4730) (0.4458) (−0.9945) (0.1627)
[0.4540] [0.0307] [0.0043] [0.0003] [0.0016] [0.0000]
Corporates BBB
0.3865∗∗ 0.1426∗∗ −10.2304 0.0181 −0.2489 −0.1028
(9.1046) (3.8020) (−1.3968) (0.3614) (−0.3224) (−0.0224)
[0.4488] [0.0346] [0.0041] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0000]
(Continued)
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Table 6. Continued
ASW2t−1 ASWt−1 Stock returnt−1 VStoxxt−1 IR−Levelt−1 Swap Spreadt−1
Corporates senior
0.5321∗∗ 0.1186∗∗ −14.6936∗ 0.0434 −0.9136 0.5897
(10.959) (2.8624) (−2.0244) (0.9708) (−1.2660) (0.1396)
[0.4330] [0.0175] [0.0086] [0.0017] [0.0025] [0.0000]
Corporates subordinated
0.4466∗∗ 0.1824∗∗ −10.8897∗ 0.0298 −1.0134 0.4952
(8.9094) (5.7129) (−2.0384) (0.9239) (−1.7635) (0.1587)
[0.3776] [0.0473] [0.0049] [0.0008] [0.0032] [0.0000]
Corporates composite
0.4929∗∗ 0.1496∗∗ −14.5235∗ 0.0551 −0.8982 0.9719
(10.416) (3.4645) (−2.0490) (1.3099) (−1.2496) (0.2334)
[0.4291] [0.0272] [0.0084] [0.0028] [0.0024] [0.0000]
Non-financials
0.5471∗∗ 0.1204∗∗ −9.6836∗ 0.0272 −1.3270 2.5513
(10.476) (2.8247) (−2.0118) (0.5743) (−1.7852) (0.5834)
[0.4717] [0.0191] [0.0080] [0.0006] [0.0052] [0.0006]
Financials
0.1577 0.1302∗∗ −8.0129 0.0381 −0.5163 0.9177
(1.0619) (3.4984) (−1.7909) (1.1008) (−0.8573) (0.2741)
[0.1566] [0.0222] [0.0047] [0.0013] [0.0008] [0.0000]
Financials senior
0.1285 0.1014∗∗ −13.4546∗ 0.0806 −0.2518 1.9505
(1.3689) (2.6230) (−2.4337) (1.8468) (−0.3383) (0.4784)
[0.1756] [0.0159] [0.0124] [0.0060] [0.0001] [0.0003]
Financials subordinated
0.4534∗∗ 0.1913∗∗ −5.6658 0.0104 −0.7220 0.2365
(8.5665) (5.7485) (−1.4263) (0.3127) (−1.2659) (0.0758)
[0.3798] [0.0506] [0.0024] [0.0001] [0.0016] [0.0000]
Banks
0.5355∗∗ 0.1333∗∗ −10.3453∗ 0.0539 −0.3633 1.5944
(8.3182) (3.4855) (−2.2662) (1.5029) (−0.5814) (0.4554)
[0.3873] [0.0232] [0.0082] [0.0027] [0.0004] [0.0002]
Tier 1 Capital
0.1082 0.1502∗∗ −10.2846 0.0208 −0.9716 2.5760
(1.7119) (5.8182) (−1.8359) (0.5906) (−1.6346) (0.7679)
[0.2752] [0.0787] [0.0044] [0.0004] [0.0029] [0.0007]
Lower Tier 2 Capital
0.6208∗∗ 0.1542∗ −10.1723 0.0150 −0.4266 0.8332
(8.1869) (4.2409) (−1.8620) (0.4384) (−0.7336) (0.2600)
[0.3931] [0.0287] [0.0043] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0000]
Notes: This table presents the α1 coefficients from the logit regressions (see Equation (3)) with t-statistics (in parentheses)
and R2 [in brackets]. We use a Huber–White consistent estimate of the covariance matrix to control for autocorrela-
tion and heteroscedasticity. The theoretical determinants are: lagged squared ASW changes (ASW2t−1), lagged ASW
changes (ASWt−1), lagged daily stock index returns (Stock returnt−1), lagged change in the VStoxx volatility index
(VStoxxt−1), lagged change in the level of the swap curve (IR_Levelt−1), and lagged changes in the difference of
the swap and the German government yield curve (Swap Spreadt−1).
Overall, our results identify historical levels and volatility of ASW spreads together with stock
returns and interest rates as the major drivers of regime shifts. It is worth noting that structural
variables that drive ASW spreads from one regime to another vary across industries. For example,
while interest rates force regime changes for automobiles and parts, telecommunications, and
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Corporates AAA, stock market returns force regime changes for personal and household goods
and banks. The above results differ from Alexander and Kaeck (2008), who identified interest
rates as the only structural variable that drives CDS spreads’ regime changes.
6. Robustness checks
We conduct further analysis and examine the robustness of our findings. In Section 6.1, we conduct
in and out-of-sample tests for accuracy of our model’s predictions. In Section 6.2, we repeat tests,
for determinants of ASW spreads and regime changes, in an extended sample to include a most
recent, post-crisis period.
6.1 Sample accuracy tests of the Markov switching model
In this section, we address two important issues. First, we examine in and out-of-sample accuracy
of our Markov model, thus, answering the question to what extent our regime-switching model
describes credit spreads during the recent financial crisis. Second, we examine the accuracy
relative to an equivalent OLS model. By comparing estimates of our regime-switching model
with the equivalent OLS model we further highlight the importance of distinguishing between
market regimes in certain industries.
6.1.1 In sample accuracy test
First, we use the Markov and the OLS models to predict changes in ASW spreads. The predictions
for the Markov model are based on the estimated parameters (reported in Table 3) for calm and
turbulent regimes. The turbulent and calm regimes were defined using probabilities estimated by
our Markov model. Observations with the estimated probabilities above 0.5 were included in the
turbulent regime. The predictions for the OLS model are based on the estimated parameters for
the entire sample period. The predictions for the two regimes are, therefore, based on the same
OLS parameters. Second, we regress the actual changes of the sample ASW spreads against the
predicted changes obtained by the respective models. We, therefore, have two regressions for each
of the regimes. Intercepts close to 0 and the slope coefficients close to 1 are an indication of a
better model accuracy.
The unreported results suggest that in the turbulent regime the models work particularly well
for oil and gas sector.36 In the calm regime, the hypothesis that the slope coefficient equals 1 has
to be rejected for all sectors. Notably, the t-statistics for the slope coefficients in the calm period
are much higher compared to the turbulent regime. The hypothesis that the intercept term equals
0 has to be rejected only in retail (OLS model) and banking (OLS and Markov models) sectors.
6.1.2 Out-of-sample accuracy test
The predictions for the out-of-sample test are based on our Markov model (Equation (5)) for
the two regimes and an equivalent OLS model using a rolling window of 500 (past) daily obser-
vations. The first estimation window starts on 6 January 2006 and ends on 18 December 2007
(500 observation). The out-of-sample period contains 278 observations (trading days), from 19
December 2007 until 29 January 2009. We then use the predictions to test the null hypothesis that
the mean difference between actual and predicted changes in ASW spreads are zero in different
regimes.37
The unreported results suggest that in the calm regime the difference between average (mean)
actual and predictedASW spread changes is not statistically significant across sectors and for both
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models. In the turbulent regime, the (absolute) mean difference between actual and predictedASW
spread changes is smaller for the Markov model compared to the OLS model in all sectors, apart
from oil and gas. Thus, the Markov model estimates are (in most cases) closer to the actual
ASW spread changes. When the OLS model is used the mean difference between actual and
predicted ASW spread changes is statistically significant for banking, telecommunication, and
the Corporates composite index. In contrast, when the Markov model is used for predictions, the
corresponding differences are not statistically significant in any of the sectors. Overall, our Markov
model, based on variables identified by the structural model of credit risk, exhibits better in and
out-of-sample accuracy compared to the equivalent OLS model for determinants of ASW spreads.
6.2 Post-crisis period
We now check for the robustness of our results in an extended sample that includes a most recent,
post-crisis period.38 Overall (unreported) results for the extended sample (January 2006–October
2013) are economically and statistically consistent with our results for the crisis period (Jan-
uary 2006–2009).39 For example, signs and significance of coefficients (Stock returns, VStoxx,
IR_Level and Swap spreads) are very similar. The new coefficients for the autocorrelation
factor (ASWt−1) are predominantly positive, thus, economically and statistically consistent, with
our earlier estimates, only in turbulent periods. During calm periods, the coefficients are no
longer predominantly negative (and significant). Instead, they are now predominantly positive.
We explain the above results with prolonged uncertainty regarding the length and scale of the
recent financial crisis, and, therefore, credit risk. The crisis period was characterized by several
major events each of which was associated with peaks in ASW spreads (see Figure 2). The calm
periods were, therefore, associated with the reversal of expectations in the aftermath of major
market events, thus, resulting in negative autocorrelation. During the extended sample period, the
sharp reversal effect was diluted because of (relatively) fewer major market events. Consequently,
the autocorrelation is predominantly positive both in turbulent and calm periods.
In the extended sample, lagged ASW2 remains the dominant driver of regime shifts with
(always) positive and statistically significant coefficients.40 Past ASW spreads changes are (statis-
tically) still a very important determinants while past Stock returns remain less important driver of
regime shifts. The other three variables (lagged VStoxx, lagged IR_Level and lagged Swap
spread) are, as previously reported, not statistically significant.
7. Conclusion
In this study we examine the time-series dynamic of credit risk based on ASW spread data for a set
of 23 European iBoxx Corporate Bond indexes during the period from 1 January 2006 to 30 January
2009. Our results suggest a leptokurtic distribution for the sample ASW spreads characterized by
huge excess kurtosis. To allow for dynamic shifts in the data generating process, we employ a
two-state Markov model. The corresponding results reveal that the estimated coefficients differ
considerably between the two regimes. For example, stock market returns are negative and in
most cases significantly associated with ASW spreads in calm periods. This result also holds in
turbulent periods but to a lesser extent. The stock market volatility has a positive effect on ASW
spreads in turbulent periods, whereas the opposite is true in calm periods. As predicted, a higher
swap spread, which can be considered as a quality premium required for non-government bonds,
demands larger ASW spreads. However, this only holds in turbulent regimes. In calm periods, the
relationship is not statistically significant. Independent of the regime, the level of interest rates is
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clearly negatively related to credit risk. Therefore, lower interest rates lead to an increase in ASW
spreads.
Our findings suggest significant differences in the importance of stock market returns, volatility,
and interest rates for explaining ASW spreads from various industries. This result is surprising
since theory predicts that all credit spreads should be affected by those variables (Collin-Dufresne,
Goldstein, and Martin 2001) and empirical evidence document considerable comovements of
credit spreads derived from bond index portfolios (Pedrosa and Roll 1998) of various indus-
tries. The above results further highlight our finding that ASW spreads exhibit regime-dependent
behaviour, especially in the financial sector. We identify market liquidity factor as one of the
important systematic components outside structural models, especially in turbulent periods.41 The
regime transitions between turbulent and calm regimes are mainly driven by lagged ASW spread
returns, lagged ASW spread return volatility, and stock returns. On the other hand, stock market
volatility, interest rate levels and swap spreads are not important drivers of regime shifts. Our
results differ from the results reported in studies on CDS spreads, which identify interest rates as
the only driver of the regime changes for CDS spreads (e.g. Alexander and Kaeck 2008).
Our regime-switching model provides estimates that match well with economic events during
the recent crisis. The model estimates are also robust in an extended sample that includes a
post-crisis period. The documented regime-specific dynamics of ASW spreads is important for
participants in the bond market, both for valuation and hedging purposes. Notably, the Markov
switching model exhibits better accuracy compared to the equivalent OLS model in a number of
industry sectors. For efficient hedging of credit risk, market participants should, therefore, take
into account differences between relevant market regimes and industry sectors. The regime shifts
may also be important for investors in exchange-traded funds that track bond indexes for different
industry sectors.
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Notes
1. In the USA, ASW are better known as Bond Total Return Swaps or Bond Total Rate of Return Swaps.
2. For a detailed description of several well-known reduced-form models, see Duffie and Singleton (1999).
3. Both Merton and Black–Scholes models consider corporate liabilities as contingent claims and are, therefore,
entirely consistent:
“Merton also developed the Black–Scholes model, and Black and Scholes had the valuation of corporate
liabilities as part of the title of their original paper. But the risk structure of interest rates for zero-coupon debt
and the extensions to coupon paying debt are in Merton (1974).” (Lando 2004, 54–55)
4. See Huang and Kong (2003), King and Khang (2002), Duffee (1998), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin
(2001), Elton et al. (2001) and Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005).
5. See Longstaff (2004).
6. This scenario is also in line with previous crisis. For example, Russian debt moratorium in 1998 resulted in
market-wide reduction in liquidity, which then led to an increase in both liquidity and default risk premiums
(see BIS 1999; Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath, 2013).
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7. For more on the calculation of Markit iBoxx indexes, see Markit (2012, 2013).
8. Based on the frequency of a bond’s fixed rate payments, the floating-rate payment frequency is determined
as follows: fixed rate paid yearly = floating rate paid semi annually; fixed rate paid semi annually = floating
rate paid quarterly; fixed rate paid quarterly = floating rate paid monthly; else: fixed frequency = floating
frequency (Markit 2013).
9. Markit Swap curve is constructed from LIBOR rates and ICAP swap rates. ICAP plc is a UK based broker
and provider of a leading interest rate swap trading platform. The curve is interpolated to account for fixed and
floating pay-offs dates. For more see Markit (2013).
10. Given that most liquid CDS spreads have 5-year maturity, we can compare our results directly to the results
reported in previous studies based on CDS spreads (Alexander and Kaeck 2008).
11. It is worth mentioning that the Corporates AAA index contains only one non-financial bond (issued by
health-care company Johnson & Johnson). The remaining 35 bonds in this index represent debt raised by
highly rated financial institutions. Tier 1 Capital consists of the most subordinated bonds issued by banks.
12. The results are also in line with anecdotal evidence for poor performance of credit rating agencies during the
recent crisis.
13. For more on Markov switching models and their applications in finance, see Ang and Timmermann (2011).
14. Our estimation procedure is based on iterative algorithm, similar to a Kalman filter (see Hamilton 1989;
Alexander and Kaeck 2008).
15. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008) also examine credit spread
changes. Studies that do not examine time-series variation in spreads and their determinants use credit spread
levels as dependent variables in respective models (see Tsuji 2005; Cremers et al. 2008; Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu
2009; Cao,Yu, and Zhong 2010). Models for levels tend to provide higher explanatory power measured by R2.
For example, Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) report R2s up to 73% in models for levels compared to R2s up to
5.4% in respective models for changes in CDS spreads.
16. For example, Byström (2006) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008) report a high degree of autocorrelation in daily
changes of CDS iTraxx index spreads, for all industry sectors. Our unreported results suggest that 15 of the
23 sample ASW spreads exhibit a highly significant degree of autocorrelation with mixed signs.
17. The variable Stock returnk,t is defined as the return of stock market index k from trading day t−1 to trading day
t, calculated as: Stock returnk,t = ln (Stock market indexk,t/Stock market indexk,t−1). Different stock market
indexes are used for the 23 ASW indexes analysed in this study. The respective stock market index for every
ASW index is reported in the last column of Table 1.
18. The variable VStoxxt is defined as the difference between the VStoxx on trading day t and the VStoxx on
trading day t−1, calculated as: VStoxxt = VStoxxt − VStoxxt−1. The use of implied rather than historical
volatility is justified by the results of previous empirical studies on credit spreads. For example, Cao, Yu, and
Zhong (2010) find that stock option implied volatilities explain CDS spreads better than historical volatilities.
Similarly, Cremers et al. (2008) show that implied volatilities improve on historical volatilities when explaining
variations of corporate bond spreads.
19. A typical example would be the arbitrary choice of a 5-year Benchmark Treasury Rate to proxy for the level
of the term structure. For more on the importance of consideration of the entire interest rate term structure
and the use of PCA in this context see Litterman and Scheinkman (1991), Düllmann, Uhrig-Homburg, and
Widfuhr (2000), or Aussenegg, Götz, and Jelic (2013).
20. Differences are defined as, Swap raten,t − Swap raten,t−1, where n represents a particular maturity.
21. Time series of swap interest rates and government bond yields are from Datastream. For an alternative proxy
for swap spreads, see Lekkos and Milas (2001).Q4
22. Our results are in line with Alexander and Kaeck (2008) and Naifar (2010), who report similar results for
changes in iTraxx CDS spread indexes.
23. It is worth noting that for the above-mentioned indexes we report a positive association between volatility and
credit spreads during turbulent periods.
24. IR_Levelt fects ASW spreads negatively in 45 out of 46 cases. In 31 of the 45 cases the effect is statistically
significant at the 5% level, or better.
25. According to authors, ‘the positive effects of an increased risk neutral drift and higher interest rate payments
by borrowers appear to be cancelled out by the negative effect of higher debt repayments’ (1016). It is worth
noting that Alexander and Kaeck (2008) sample period ends before the recent credit crisis.
26. The results are available from authors upon request.
27. The likelihood ratio is asymptotically χ2(5) distributed.
28. The results are available from authors upon request.
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29. The Tier 1 Capital sector has the highest Likelihood ratio (LR) statistic.
30. Results are available from authors upon request.
31. Automobiles and parts and chemicals at the 10% significance level. Personal and household goods and utility
at the 5% significance level.
32. Alexander and Kaeck (2008) tested their model down in a similar fashion (see 1018).
33. By the end of 2006, 75% of all US subprime mortgages had been securitized and sold worldwide (Demyanyk
and Van Hemert 2011).
34. The model is adopted from Clarida et al. (2006) and Alexander and Kaeck (2008).
35. This is consistent with Alexander and Kaeck (2008) results for iTraxx Europe CDS spreads.
36. The results are available from authors upon request.
37. The turbulent and calm regimes are defined using probabilities estimated by the Markov model.
38. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
39. The results are available from authors upon request.
40. Estimates with lagged squared changes in spreads also exhibit the highest R2s.
41. This finding is in line with Duffie and Singleton (1999) who report that both credit risk and liquidity factors
are necessary to explain changes in US swap rates.
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